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Abstract
Manufacturing flexibility is wide field of research that lacks a clear and concise
definition. It has been described by some to be a source of competitive advantage.
Others have described manufacturing flexibility as analogous to quality as a critical
measure of manufacturing capability. This thesis considers the role of manufacturing
flexibility as it applies to a manufacture of luxury products. A specific definition of
flexibility is applied to this firm based on its particular industrial evolutionary stage and
operational objectives. Probabilistic modeling, linear optimization and iterative
simulation is used to show that volume and product mix flexibility can substantially
improve the ability to respond to customer demands while improving capacity utilization.
Network flow modeling illustrates that significant benefits can be achieved with limited
flexibility. The full benefits of this flexibility are detailed and the organizational barriers
to change are explored.
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Introduction
This thesis is based on research and analysis of a major US manufacturing company
during a six month internship at the company. This company, hitherto referred to as the
Open Road Manufacturing Company (ORMC), is a domestic manufacturer of
recreational vehicles that require significant fabrication and assembly manufacturing
based in multiple locations. This multi-echelon supply chain consists of fabrication and
assembly facilities with raw material externally supplied and the majority of sub-
component fabrication occurring within ORMC facilities. The long history of ORMC
manufacturing is based on a variety of manufacturing strategies throughout the
company's existence. This heritage is a defining feature of ORMC's products and the
maintenance of and devotion to this heritage is a defining cultural element within the
company.
History
Open Road Manufacturing began as a custom fabrication shop specializing in
recreational products. Early technical innovation and design success resulted in ORMC
becoming the largest manufacturer in their industry during the first half of the 2 0 th
century. Production of recreational products was halted to support the US military during
both world wars and served to establish both a sound manufacturing base for the
company but also provided a brand recognition and loyalty in the servicemen that used
their products during the war.
The ORMC customer base proved to be highly loyal to the brand and this continues to be
a distinguishing feature of the company and its customers. In the 1970's the company
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went through a period of intense competition, stagnant design and poor manufacturing
quality which eroded their market share dramatically. The customer's loyalty was
challenged but its strength may have been the reason ORMC was able to rebound.
During this time the company greatly increased its internal production capabilities and
expanded its manufacturing network. While this expansion enabled strong growth in
infrastructure it also resulted in greatly increasing the defects within the products. This,
in turn, put pressure on the existing customer base while they continued to lose market
share to entrants into the market.
In the early 1980's the company faced extinction but instead mounted a dramatic
turnaround with a highly leveraged buy-out, reinvigoration of innovation and
implementation of improved manufacturing principles. The focus turned toward
measuring and maintaining quality, reducing wasted effort and inventory, and employee
involvement. This manufacturing strategy complemented the efforts to regain market
share and reestablish credibility with customers by reducing defects and increasing the
availability of products in the market. Building on this momentum the company began to
increase the product offering and introduced new models and new variations to its
existing product lines. These new models relied heavily on two significant advancements
in technology. The first innovation increased the comfort of the customer while
maintaining the aesthetics of the product. The second was innovation in the power train
design, quality and performance. These advancements established a product portfolio
that opened its product base to new customers while maintaining appeal to the existing
customer base. In addition the company began aggressively marketing their products to
both the existing customers and to new market segments. By the 1990's the demand for
9
ORMC products was greatly exceeding its ability to deliver products from the single
plant ORMC was using to produce all models.
The long term goal set at this time was to increase supply in order to meet demand
without compromising quality. A focused manufacturing strategy was implemented.
This strategy was based on product platform or families with each family manufactured
on a dedicated assembly line. Product variation within a family is a significant reduction
in complexity compared to product variation between families. The construction of new
manufacturing facilities and the implementation of this focused manufacturing strategy
enabled production to increase by -15% annually until 2003. Between 1983 and 2006
yearly production increased by greater than fourteen times while quality was maintained.
During this time of volume growth the complexity growth kept pace, two new product
platforms, 2.7 times the number of models and two additional production facilities were
introduced by the company. Figure 1 show this historic volume growth and growth of
product variants.
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Figure 1. Historic growth in volume and complexity.
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Shifting Priorities
Open Road Manufacturing Company enjoyed numerous operational advantages due to
having such strong demand. Virtually every product produced was sold. In fact,
customer waiting lists were actively maintained with backlogs of up to two years in some
cases. Customers exhibited amazing flexibility with regard to product options and
product platforms. The lack of market feedback combined with the dedication to the
company's heritage combined to reinforce a mass manufacturing mentality initially
instilled by the focused manufacturing strategy. Styling and engineering changes
occurred slowly, new product introductions were handled conservatively, and
manufacturing systems evolved slowly and steadily. Furthermore, this change occurred
within each product family with minimal cross-family sharing. Figure 2 illustrates this
with a system dynamics model.
Priorities:
1. Quality
2. Focused capacity +
3. Low cost
Manufacturing: Automate,
+ Mass dedicate, continuously
Engineering, Production improve
styling & marketing Periodic
changes Retool Manage: Part cost
Customer
responsiveness
Figure 2. Mass Production Cycle.
The reinforcing loops of mass production and periodic retool were effective means of
maintaining the relentless march towards meeting demand and resulted in periodic
expenditure to increase capacity. Figure 3 shows a single ORMC manufacturing
11
location's expenditure over time to sustain this strategy. The most recent expansion
project exceeded $ 1OOM and took over two years to complete.
FE
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
I Capital Expenditure - Capacity
Figure 3. Capital expenditure over time to maintain capacity.
Focused manufacturing was the strategy employed to increase supply to meet demand.
ORMC was highly effective in achieving this objective and in 2003 a growth in product
inventory indicated that they had reached saturation and growth was no longer needed.
Market feedback was now available. With short supply it appeared that whatever ORMC
made was accepted by the market. Now that customers had a choice of available
products their voice could now be heard.
The high cost of maintaining a growth strategy and ORMC's inability to respond quickly
to fluctuations in demand are driving strategic changes. The following section will
analyze the changes and provide a context for understanding why they are occurring as
well as what course of action should be taken.
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Motivation for Change
The business strategy of ORMC is currently in flux. The leadership structure established
in the mid-1990's was based on a consensus model centered on three major areas of
focus: producing products, creating demand and support. This fit with the focused
manufacturing policy and provided clarity of purpose to every employee. A business unit
either maintained a close relationship to the customer, produced the highest quality
product or supported one of these functions. In 2006, this leadership model was
redesigned to include four focus areas: produce products, design products, sales and
marketing and provide support. This might be described as clarification of
responsibilities. The cultural and political ramifications of this change will be considered
in later sections. As part of this change the CEO challenged every business unit to
become more flexible. The next section will cover four aspects of ORMC and analyze
why these changes are occurring. Market dynamics, product innovation, three phases of
industrial innovation and projected market demand will provide a strategic analysis that
will form the basis for justifying the need for ORMC's change. Finally, flexibility will
be defined as it pertains to manufacturing in ORMC.
Market Dynamics
One of the fundamental motivations for change for ORMC is the current stage of their
lifecycle. One model for industry life cycles is the S Curve (Christensen 1997). Figure 4
shows the basic structure of the S curve. There are three key phases in this model:
Ferment, take-off and maturity. It is proposed that ORMC's transition from ferment to
take-off occurred in 1983 and that the inflection point between take-off and maturity
occurred in 2003. The period from 1903 to 1983 can be classified in very general terms
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as a period of ferment where their dominant design was taking shape. There are a
number of smaller S curves during this early time period corresponding to both the
evolution of the product and the complete lifecycle of now obsolete products through this
time. However, this time period can aggregately be thought of as a long fermentation
period.
Maturity
cu
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off:
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Time
Figure 4. Structure of S Curve.
During this ferment stage ORMC established the dominant design that continues to
define their product aesthetically but they had not yet tipped into the rapid growth phase
experienced in the take-off phase of this life cycle model.
A number of factors came together to tip ORMC from a producer for a small stable niche
of customers to an iconic product with broad appeal throughout the market. Significant
but smaller events occurred, each one alone may not have been sufficient to tip
(Galdwell, 2002). Indications that a tipping point had occurred are: customers were
willing to wait for extended periods to time to take delivery of product, a robust resale
market emerged that enabled customers to resell products for more than retail, and an
industry segment emerged based on parts and accessories dedicated to the customization
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and personalization of ORMC products. This tipping point marks the inflection point
between ORMC's fermentation stage and take-off stage. The tipping elements include:
" The symbolic recovery of ORMC from near bankruptcy as a dramatic storyline
for an American manufacturer during a time when American manufacturing was
losing to foreign competition.
" The styling and engineering groups within ORMC successfully updated the
suspension of their vehicles through an innovative design that maintained the
aesthetic elements of the product but provided significant comfort which made the
product more accessible to a wider range of customers.
" ORMC redesigned the vehicle power train such that it dramatically improved
quality and performance. ORMC's reputation for poor quality in the vehicles
immediately proceeding this time period was legendary and the vehicle often
required maintenance prior to initial sale.
" A focused and widespread marketing campaign known as "close to the customer"
was initiated. This close to the customer strategy started in 1983 with an
established ORMC membership club. This not only stimulated interest in their
products it also gave executives, engineers and employees throughout ORMC an
opportunity to meet and interact with customers. In addition, ORMC began a
highly focused brand management effort that included branded clothing, general
merchandise and product accessories. This branding has, at times, been extended
as far as cafes and cross-branding with other companies.
15
Together these elements created phenomenal demand resulting in a greater than 21 fold
increase in revenue from 1983 to 2006, and between 1989 and 2002 this increase was
constrained by capacity. The magnitude of the impact on potential revenue growth due to
lost customers is unknown.
From the S curve framework this period of rapid growth coincides with the take-off phase
as shown in Figure 5. The question of whether the inflection point between the take-off
and maturation phase exists within this timeframe is easier analyzed with a different set
of data. The aggregate revenue of ORMC is a function of the primary product sales and
the network effects of their complementary assets.
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Figure 5. ORMC Gross revenue. Curve represents over a 21x increase in net income over this time
period. (Source: Annual reports)
This includes the major categories of parts and accessories, domestic and international
product sales and general merchandise. When product sales in these markets are isolated
and the domestic and international sales are separated a clearer picture emerges. The rate
of increase in domestic product sales has started decreasing as shown in Figure 6.
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Figure 6. Revenue from product sales domestic and international. (Source: Annual reports)
The indication that the domestic market is entering a maturity phase is the dominant
feature of ORMC's market because the domestic revenues have consistently represented
between 70-80% of the company's yearly revenue during this time period.
On an aggregate level ORMC product performance in the market follows the behavior of
the S curve model. The ferment stage of this evolution is marked with a high number of
variations in the product itself with a growing base of customers and market share. The
inflection point between the ferment and take-off period is marked by a tipping of the
market from a slow and steady growth to a dramatic increase in market performance and
dramatic increase in production and an overall growth in the market itself. The transition
from take-off to maturation may be segmented by customer base or geography as ORMC
begins to grow its target customer base. However, the maturation of the domestic market
appears evident and as such it is strong indication that this inflection point has been
reached.
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This is one indication of the emerging changes in ORMC business strategy. Additional
evidence points to why ORMC is transforming its strategic plan. An analysis of the
product innovation and the dynamics of this innovation over time will illustrate this.
Product Innovation
Numerous innovative product improvements have been introduced by ORMC throughout
the years as both incremental improvement and in response to competition. Figure 7
shows a the pace of product innovation for a single product component along a single
dimension, engine horsepower. This is not the only product innovation ORMC has
achieved but it exemplifies the predominate adherence to incremental innovation. In
1909 ORMC introduced an engine architecture that continues to be used in 96% of its
current production. There have been significant performance improvements to this
design but these are refinements and incremental innovations to this product.
115 3rd Generation - ~
TC8 TC9
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60 QSH~ -60
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Year
Figure 7. Innovation evolution for ORMC's major market engine design. Each point on the line
represents an incremental innovation of the core architecture.
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The ability to continue this incremental product evolution may be limited within the
current design constraints. Material properties, engine geometry and passenger comfort
from heat generation all pose limiting constraints for this technology..
Another way to view the product innovation of ORMC is to view this through the product
family evolution over time. Figure 8 shows the major product families as they evolved
over time. This is shown as the cumulative evolution of each family over time as
determined subjectively by the author. In the previous section the time period prior to
1983 (outside the dashed region in the figure) was generalized as a single ferment phase.
- - Family 5
SGF
HMD
I I I Family I
1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
Figure 8. Product family evolution over time. The dashed region highlights the time period under
analysis.
This is clearly not a single incremental evolution as presented in the S curve analysis.
Rather this time period is an amalgam of numerous product variants and attempts to
define and refine the dominate design. Given the emergence of a dominate design that is
highly reinforced by ORMC and the discontinuity of performance between the distant
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and recent time periods this generalization does not detract from the previous analysis.
Figure 9 shows the volume increase associated with the dashed region of Figure 8.
Figure 9. Growth of the product families from 1983 to present.
The convergence and leveling of the innovation occurring across four of the five product
families is the second indication that ORMC has reached a new phase in their evolution.
Taking another analytic perspective will reveal the third piece of evidence as to why
ORMC is in the process of updating their strategic roadmap. This will explain why
flexibility is the appropriate goal to define in the evolution of the manufacture of
ORMC's products.
Three Phases of Industrial Innovation
Another model of the dynamic lifecycle of a firm that is closely related to the S curve is
the general model introduced in (Abernathy 1978) and later refined in (Utterback 1996).
This model includes both product and process innovation defined within a framework of
three phases: Fluid, Transitional and Specific, as shown in Figure 10. For ORMC, the
fluid phase of product innovation coincides with the ferment phase and has
predominately passed. During the fermentation phase of their innovation cycle there
20
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were a wide variety of structural, power train and aesthetic variants. The dominate
product design took root in the 1930s and remains a defining aspect of ORMC products
and their competitors imitations.
0 Product innovation
0
Process innovation
'4-
0
a)
Fluid Transitional Specific
Phase Phase Phase
Figure 10. Dynamics of Innovation Model from Utterback and Abernathy.
Following a period of major product innovation the transitional period occurs when
process innovation takes root to enable the firm to focus on efficiency and manufacturing
systems. For ORMC the first wave of this cycle culminated in the specific phase
occurring during the time when aggressive growth of capacity occurred, in response to
intense competition from entering competitors, without a corresponding growth of
process or product innovation from ORMC. This resulted in significant loss of market
share to the entrants. Figure 11 shows ORMC's evolution through these phases. An
interesting feature of ORMC's evolution is that they were able to revitalize their
innovative efforts and resurrect the company from near extinction without a major
disruptive innovation in their core product.
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Figure 11. Illustration of the two waves of innovation cycles occurring for ORMC.
Instead, as detailed in Market Dynamics section, a number of smaller product innovations
fueled this reinvigoration. Concurrent with this second wave of product innovations was
a significant focus on process innovation. ORMC implemented a production system
based on manufacturing principles gleaned through benchmarking of Japanese production
methods. Statistical process control, employee empowerment and just-in-time operations
were critical elements in enabling ORMC to integrate quality in order to create and
sustain a premium product, sold at a premium price. The combination of product and
process innovation marks the second wave of the innovation cycle for ORMC.
Viewing ORMC within the innovation cycle framework will demonstrate that they have
entered the specific phase. Utterback classifies product, process, organization, market
and competition within this general framework. For this analysis, detailing the product
and process traits through these phases will suffice. Table 1 summarizes Utterback's
characterization of each phase and highlights the evidence of how ORMC is
demonstrating these characteristics.
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Table 1. ORNMC characteristics in relation to Utterback's Three Phase Model
Fluid Phase Transitional Phase Specific Phase
Product Definition Diverse designs, At least one product Mostly
often customized design, stable undifferentiated,
enough to have standard products
significant
production volume
ORMC Product Rapid introduction Production volumes Despite high
of new technical in all products number of models
features: increasing ~15% per within each product
suspension, engine, year family, year-over-
transmission year differentiation
for each model is
low
Process Definition Flexible and Becoming more Efficient, capital
inefficient, major rigid, with changes intensive, and rigid;
changes easily occurring in major cost of change high
accommodated steps
ORMC Process Changing from Focused factory Cost of changes
batching, high (focus assembly becoming
inventory, low line), changes occur prohibitive
quality to through construction
sequenced, JIT, SPC of new factory or
based production line
system
Utterback's model is useful for understanding the dynamics of ORMC's current situation.
One distinction to note is that in Utterback's model the specific phase is characterized by
price competition amongst competitors. In ORMC's case they learned during the specific
period of their first wave that they could not effectively compete on price. Their
competition effectively copied their products and offered them at a lower price. ORMC
made the conscious decision to maintain a high quality, high price strategy. Material
selection, retention of craftsmanship in critical components and maintaining core
competency in product differentiation features contribute to the high quality. This luxury
status does not invalidate the use of the three-phase model for ORMC; instead, the model
must be applied to this case deliberately. Recommendations that might be given to a
commodity product producer may not be applicable in ORMC's case.
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Despite this, the three-phase model is a useful framework for assessing ORMC position
in their evolution. One final piece of evidence that ORMC has reached their second
specific phase is the stabilization of their market share. Utterback characterizes the
specific phase as a stabilization of market share. Figure 12 shows ORMC's domestic
market share stabilizing over this time period.
70.00%
60.00%
50.00%
40.00%
30.00% -
20.00%
10.00%
0.00%_
Figure 12. Domestic market share in ORMC core industry segment (Source: Annual reports)
Market dynamics, product innovation and Utterback's three phases of innovation
provided multiple frameworks with which to determine what motivating factors were
driving a shift in the strategic direction for the company. The slowing of incremental
innovation in production process and product capabilities and the maturation and slowing
growth of the domestic market indicate that ORMC has entered a state of maturity in the
majority of its core products. Disruptive innovation, achieving take-off in non-traditional
markets or diversification are potential options for sustaining the business results ORMC
investors have come to expect. This thesis does not have recommendations for which
option or by what means ORMC should plan their corporate strategy. However, it is
noted that many options are currently being pursued. Instead, this thesis provides
recommendations for efficiently sustaining the manufacture of the current product
24
families without compromising the quality or inter-family differentiation the market
demands. Before delving into the details of these recommendations there is one final
topic that provides a high level of motivation for changing the current manufacturing
strategy. This issue is more tactical in nature and is specifically related to the capacity
requirements in the near future.
Future Capacity Challenges
ORMCs focused factory manufacturing strategy resulted in dedication of assembly lines
to product families. This dedication allows manufacturing teams to build competency
and engineering teams to maintain subcomponent differentiation. This has created rigid
systems, with inefficient capital overhead, and inefficient supply chains. While each of
these issues has an associated cost, the most urgent issue created is the inability to
respond to product demand.
Fluctuations in demand require adaptability in production systems; however, ORMC is
not currently structured to manage this. The following scenarios highlight this
misalignment. If demand drops, then assembly lines are underutilized and the cost per
unit rises significantly. In this case the intrinsic motivation of the assembly line
managers is to maintain productive employees and highly utilized equipment. This can
result in over production relative to market demand. On the other hand, if demand
exceeds capacity slightly then costs increase due to overtime. In this case the assembly
line managers have the incentive to reduce overtime to control their direct costs,
potentially resulting in missed demand or delays in fulfilling this demand. Finally, if
demand greatly exceeds capacity this will result in product shortages and potential lost
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sales or low customer service. The economics of mismatched supply and demand are
problematic. Each of the above is made worse due to the organizational motivation that
results in amplifying these issues as opposed to working towards correcting them.
Finally, focused assembly lines represent single points of failure in the system.
Unexpected equipment downtime, major upgrades, new model introductions or labor
shortages have ripple effects throughout the value chain for this product family. A
significant event resulting in an assembly line stoppage can result in direct market impact
because the value chain has been built to minimize system inventory.
From a tactical perspective, there is a sense of urgency due to the projected demand in the
near future. Figure 13 shows the projected demand for the five product families together
with the available capacity for each assembly line.
Line 1
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- capacity]
Line 4 Line 5
Pc A
-- DemandC apaci 0emad -Capaity]
Figure 13. PDF of forecasted demand relative to projected capacity.
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Projected demand and available capacity are shown as probability density functions given
by Equation 1.
1N(p,U2)= f(X) e 2 (1)
In the case of capacity, the mean value, p, of the capacity distribution is the average
yearly unit production capacity of each line. The standard deviation, o; of the capacity
represents 5% variability for each line. In the case of demand, the mean value is the unit
volume projection generated by ORMC for a particular year. This is the best guess that
ORMC can make based on current and projected market conditions. The variability
around this mean is the sample standard deviation of the yearly production for each
product family. Actual production variability is used as a proxy for demand variability
rather than an arbitrary percentage in part due to ORMC's history of limited supply.
Limited supply has historically masked demand and the limited time since supply has
been balanced makes historical experience unreliable. When modeling the supply and
demand as normal distributions and plotting each product family on the same scale it is
clear to see that the capacity of each assembly line is not matched to the projected
demand'. This will necessarily result in higher than optimal unit cost throughout the
product base. These distributions are the input into the simulation used to model the
manufacturing network and will be discussed in detail in the Modeling Description
section of this document. They are shown here to illustrate that there is opportunity to
1 Note that the location of the mean for each PDF is of interest in the plots shown in figure. Then mean, p,
of capacity and demand are highlighted in family 4. This can be read as capacity exceeding demand for
this product since the pcapacity > pUdemand.
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experience all of the inefficient scenarios explained above, underutilization, overtime
utilization and exceeding available utilization if no action is taken.
Motivation for Change Summary
ORMC's history has been strategically analyzed to provide a compelling argument that
there is a need for change. This need has been recognized at a corporate level as evident
through the modification of the leadership structure, the emergence of flexibility as a
priority, and the desire to be more responsive to the customer. A change in corporate
strategy requires a change in manufacturing strategy (Skinner 1969). The design of the
changes in manufacturing should fit with ORMC's current industry stage. They need to
service and sustain a large domestic customer base in a mature market while being
responsive and receptive to emerging demographic and geographic markets in hopes of
tipping these market segments into a take-off phase of growth. This will require
approaching the design of their flexibility strategy carefully and deliberately. One way to
setup the topic of flexibility is to think about it in relation to the system dynamics model
previously presented. Figure 14 shows a new approach that is focused on customer
desires and flexibility in manufacturing.
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Figure 14. Innovative operational strategies necessary to incorporate customer demand
This system dynamic model shows that flexibility is not an incremental process
innovation; instead there is a need for a new way of thinking about manufacturing. T
old model was based on quality and output. Quality must remain the predominant
priority but when flexibility and understanding of customer needs replaces output and
growth as priorities, the ability to achieve customer responsiveness becomes part of a
reinforcing loop that is inherent in the manufacturing design.
Manufacturing Flexibility Frameworks
Literature Review
In the literature, flexibility has emerged as a critical component of manufacturing
strategy. In a statement, "Ten to fifteen years ago, quality was much like flexibility is
today: vague and difficult to improve yet critical to competitiveness." (Upton 1995)
While a decade has past since this statement, there remains a lack of definition associated
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with the term flexibility. This is due to there being a multitude of applications, systems
and operations that can in themselves be flexible. These dimensions of flexibility have
been explored in seminal papers (Sethi and Sethi 1990) and (Gupta and Goyal 1989) and
further refined in (Koste and Malhotra 1999). Figure 15 shows a graphical framework
that encompasses the totality this topic space.
Strategic Flexibility
OrganizationalMarketing Flexibility Flexibilitys Flex
Manufacturing Flexibility
Moiiaion Flexibili
Volume Flexibiliy New Product
Mix Flexibility Expansion Flex Flexibility
'Qperation Flexibility
Routing Flexkibility
Material Handling Labor Flexibility
Flexibility Machine Flexibili
Figure 15. Breadth of flexibility within a firm's strategic objective. Adapted from Koste and
Malhotra (1999).
Numerous studies have focused on providing decision frameworks. These frameworks
are used to determine how a given part can be made or fabricated to support a flexible
strategy (Hauser 2004). Others have provided guidance on how flexibility can enable
better service levels. "Flexibility is loosely defined as the ability to alter important
operations characteristics of the equipment of features of the item it is making." (Whitney
1995)
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While still others approach this topic from the perspective of minimizing the impact of
unknown events, "The flexibility of a manufacturing system indicates its capability to
respond to the changing circumstances and/or to the instability caused by the
environment" (Gupta and Goyal, 1989). On the other hand, Atkinson and Meager (1986)
have taken the tact of addressing flexibility through labor.
A class of studies has focused on the interaction between the sub-classes of flexibility.
Volume and product (mix) flexibility at the machine level is examined in detail in
(Pelaez-Ibarrondo and Ruiz-Mercader, 2001). Goyal and Netessine (2006) model the
interaction between volume and product (mix) flexibility to address market uncertainty.
They derive a number of interesting relationships between product and volume flexibility,
however, their closed form solutions present formidable barriers to practical application
needed for a real-world problem. In contrast to the academic analysis performed in many
of the cited works, Jordan and Graves (1995) focused on volume and product flexibility
and developed a model and simulation that is readily adaptable to the complexities of a
multi-platform/multi-line manufacturing problem.
The Jordan and Graves approach is used to analyze ORMC's flexibility options because
it fits ORMC's objective of enabling responsiveness to customer needs. Before detailing
the application of volume and mix flexibility, a brief case study of the automotive
industries adoption of flexible manufacturing practices will illustrate why it is important
to be clear about what flexibility means to manufacturing operations and how this fits
with the corporate strategy that manufacturing is supposed to enable.
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Know What Should be Flexible Instead of How to be Flexible
A recent trend in automotive manufacturing is the pursuit of flexibility. A review of
popular literature reveals the following benefits of flexibility:
" Produce more and better cars- more economically (Vasilash 2004)
" Launch more products more rapidly (Vasilash 2000)
" Boost quality and efficiency (Waurzyniak 2003)
* Respond more quickly to changing market demands while increasing factory
utilization (Teresko 2006)
While it is possible to achieve each of these objectives through flexible manufacturing,
the specific definition and implementation must be matched to the specifics of the firm.
A review of a non-ORMC domestic automotive power train manufacturing plant provides
an example of the implementation of an aggressive flexibility plan that has failed to
deliver the return on investment expected. According to Waurzyniak, this plant expects
to realize initial cost savings of 10-15%, up to 50% cost reduction in mid-cycle
changeovers, and nearly $2 billion in cost savings over the coming decade. An on site
visit revealed that the plant is designed for manufacturing flexibility along nearly all
dimensions. Mix, volume, modification, expansion and new product flexibility are
possible through the implementation of numerous enabling capabilities: Automated
material handling with standardized carrier designs, machine flexibility with automated
recipe management, cross-trained labor pool, standardized layout, redundant cell
capacity, and additional floor space available for expansion. The cost of this project was
not revealed during the visit, however, it was discussed that since the completion of the
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plant redesign, the engine that is produced at Windsor has not changed. A "50%
reduction in mid-cycle changeover" has little value if mid-cycle changeovers do not
occur. This plant provides a valuable lesson in ensuring that the flexibility investment
addresses the flexible needs of the corporation. A misalignment in the manufacturing
flexibility strategy can result in costly investments with little return.
An additional consideration is that flexibility cannot be pursued in lieu of other
manufacturing priorities. Chrysler's President and CEO, Tom LaSorda, launched an
aggressive flexibility transformation in 2003, investing billions of dollars in flexible
manufacturing systems (Terescko 2006). In contrast to the Ford Winsor example,
Chrysler's flexible strategy is consistent with their operating strategy. Their intention
was to be able to produce a lower volume of vehicles while maintaining scale economies
in their assemble plants. This was accomplished by standardizing processes across
models and ensuring that model changeover could be accomplished with robotic end
effector change-outs as opposed to retooling entire automated cells. Lasorda, in his
Chrysler Group Overview presentation (2004) defines flexibility as: plant-to-plant
flexibility (chaining), volume flexibility, architecture/platform flexibility, model
flexibility, supplier/component flexibility and business model flexibility. The recognition
that the entire manufacturing ecosystem needs to comprehend flexibility was a crucial
aspect of enabling Chrysler to accomplish this transformation. Each of their major US
and Canada assembly plants have 3 models in production with the capability of
concurrently launching a fourth. In (LaSorda 2006) Chrysler reported capacity utilization
of 95% in 2005 relative to 84% in 2001. However, it appears now that the focus on
flexibility may have contributed to a defocus in quality. Chrysler currently has 3 separate
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recalls totaling over 500,000 units from plants undergoing flexible upgrades (Krolicki
2007). The key take-away from this case study is that flexibility cannot be viewed in
isolation nor can it be pursued at the expense of quality. To be clear, it is not suggested
that the financial challenges Chrysler is currently facing are the result of their flexible
manufacturing but rather that their excitement over this capability may have caused them
to overextend their product portfolio and lose focus on other critical operating elements.
In their recovery plans (LaSorda 2007) they intend to leverage their flexible
manufacturing network to increase their new model introduction while reducing the
number of platforms. This will allow each plant to focus on quality while maintaining
their flexibility.
Knowing what needs to be flexible to enable the corporate strategy is a necessary
component of achieving the corporate objectives. Maintaining flexibility as a part of the
holistic operational environment will allow the organization to maintain all critical
operational priorities. Finally, recognition that flexibility is not a panacea for whatever
ails the firm will maintain perspective and allow the design of the flexible network to be
contained within the feasible realm of possibilities. This has been the goal in the
approach to ORMC's flexibility recommendations. Included in this recommendation are
the critical flexibility components, ensuring that they are consistent with ORMC's
operating strategy, and seeking implemental solutions that comprehend the structural,
political and cultural environment of the organization.
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Volume and Product Mix Flexibility
In order to sustain mature operations ORMC needs to increase the aggregate utilization of
their assembly lines. This will allow them to fulfill demand of high-valued products
without investing additional capital in focused assembly systems. In this mature market,
repurchase may become a more dominate market feature and as such model trade-off
may become a more prevalent. For these reasons, volume and product mix is the most
appropriate type of flexibility needed in the assembly network at this time.
Volume and mix flexibility are shown in Figure 15 on the same level as expansion,
modification and new product introduction. Focusing on volume and mix is not intended
to ignore these other components, rather they are the items in focus because they are the
least evident components in ORMCs capabilities today. The modification and new
product introduction processes in existence today have opportunity for improvement but
are functioning sufficiently to support the operational strategy. An in-depth analysis of
these systems is beyond the scope of this thesis. In addition, expansion flexibility is also
a component that is peripheral to this thesis. If volume and mix flexibility are effectively
achieved then expansion needs will be minimized in a mature market. If demand greatly
increases in emerging markets then expansion will be required outside of the existing
network, in which case growing the network to be consistent with the recommendations
herein will suffice. Therefore expansion flexibility is not explored in any further depth.
Flexibility Summary
Flexibility has been defined along numerous dimensions. For ORMC, manufacturing
flexibility is defined as the ability to effectively respond to variable market demand. In
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order to achieve this flexibility it is proposed that volume and mix flexibility be pursued
within ORMC's existing assembly network and by doing so increase the utilization of the
current manufacturing assets. This recommendation is an attempt to define the
manufacturing strategy consistent with the corporate strategy within ORMC. Therefore it
is important to be clear that this flexibility is not being recommended as a reaction to or
in opposition to the existing focused factory strategy. Instead it can be viewed as an
updated focus in alignment with new business strategy. This thesis is also not advocating
flexibility as a means to handle randomness or ability to produce every product on every
line. The recommendations that are detailed in the next section should be viewed as an
approach that continues to embody the focused factory approach (Skinner 1974), but also
enables the realization of responsiveness to the volatile market and increasing product
discrimination from the customer as needed.
Achieving this objective will enable benefits beyond revenue and capacity utilization. A
strategy of flexibility allows a firm to take advantage of new technologies or new market
opportunities (Sanchez 1995) and will position ORMC to take the necessary risks in
pursuit of disruptive technologies that may allow them to capture new markets.
Furthermore, flexibility can be ORMC's competitive advantage in a dynamic market
where traditional competitive advantages are temporary (Fine 1998). The clock speed of
the industry is quickening. ORMC's major component refresh cycles are contracting, as
shown in Figure 16. This figure shows the time between major engine releases.
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Figure 16. Increasing clock speed as shown by years between major engine refresh.
Finally, there is an implicit concern that flexibility will lead to inefficiency. At the
operator level there may be lost efficiency. An assembly technician may be responsible
for additional steps in their area. Line side inventory or the material handling of multi-
family components may increase. Both of which may lead to increase localized
inefficiency. However, the trade-off between efficiency and flexibility can be resolved
by focusing on the firm wide efficiency and not merely the efficiency of the production
system (Carlsson 1989). The quantification of the firm wide efficiency was not
attempted but anecdotally can be viewed in relation to the assembly line capacity. The
inefficiency of an assembly line operating at 30% of its designed capacity seems to out
weigh the cumulative inefficiency associated with operator task complexity.
Quantifying the Benefits of Flexibility
Flexibility Benefit Overview
The analysis used to quantify the benefits of volume and mix flexibility resulted in a
number of key benefits. Each of these benefits will be detailed in the following sections
and are summarized here for clarity.
37
" Flexibility benefits can be achieved with low complexity. Full chain flexibility
provides a structure that achieves 96% of the benefits possible in a fully flexible
assembly network.
" Aggregate capital utilization can be increased from 82% to 95%.
o This improves line loading on each line.
o In addition, labor utilization is stabilized and can therefore be
standardized.
" Increase in customer fulfillment increases revenues and avoids the cost of lost
sales.
o Even with worst case scenario conditions where operating costs increase
on a per unit basis, operating margins can be maintained.
The basis for this analysis is a linear model and Monte Carlo simulation that heavily
draws from Graves and Jordan (1991) and Jordan and Graves (1995).
Modeling Description
ORMC product families are dedicated to a single assembly line. This purpose of this
model is to aid in the planning decision of determining which product families should be
put on which assembly line. The goal of this allocation decision is to achieve the level of
flexibility required to most effectively respond to changes in product demand. This can
be formally describe as a collection of ordered pairs, A, where (i, j) e A such that
assembly linej can produce product family i. This can be thought of as a collection of
nodes connected by arcs with one node for each product family and one node per
assembly line. The connection of a pair of nodes by an arc denotes the capability for the
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production of that family by the assembly line. Figure 17 shows a network diagram of
the current ORMC manufacturing network (a) and a network diagram for total flexibility,
such that all models being produced on all lines (b).
C -E
(a) (b)
Figure 17. Network diagram representation of no flexibility and total flexibility.
The evaluation of configuration A will be in terms of the amount of demand that can be
fulfilled. For a given demand, the amount of production will be determined by
minimizing the cost of maximally fulfilling the demand with the given configuration, A.
The function V(A) will be the minimized cost for the configuration A and will be solved
with the following linear program:
m n 
mV(A) = max I rx - c's,j
Where:
m is the number of product families
n is the number of assembly lines
x,;= unit from family i produced on linej
ri;= net revenue per unit from producing family i on linej, equal to the per-unit
revenue from family i minus per-unit production costa
c; = cost of lost sale
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Subject to the following constraints:
x, ki Vj=1,2,..., n
Yx, + s = D, Vi = L,2,...,IM
Where:
k; is the capacity of assembly linej
si is the shortfall of product family i
Di is the actual demand for product family i
Heuristically, to determine the best configuration of products to assembly lines and
determine how much flexibility is needed the following procedure is utilized
1. Model family demand and final vehicle assembly capacity as normal distributions
2. Randomly sample a specific demand and capacity from the distributions for each
product and assembly line
3. Determine the capability of the manufacturing network to fulfill demand with the
given capacity by optimizing the network to minimize the cost of operations and
the cost of lost sales
4. Compute the revenue generated and the overall utilization of the given
manufacturing network
This process is then repeated multiple times in order to compute a statistical result.
Figure 18 shows the one of the output variables, revenue, generated from a 1000 iteration
simulation run for a given network design.
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Figure 18. Histogram of revenue resulting from 1000 run simulation
Model Details
Significant time and effort were dedicated to obtaining accurate model parameters and
model input to provide accurate and useful results. For this study a year within the next
five years was chosen. This allowed the analysis to be based on reasonable projections
while still being informative to the current operation. Input parameters include product
demand forecast and assembly line capacity. Model parameters are defined by financial
variables. These include revenue, operating cost and opportunity cost. Each of these
parameters will now be explained.
Demand is modeled as a truncated normal distribution, N(Ud, ad) where pd is given by
the unit volume projection (UVP) for each product family for the year under analysis.
The UVPs are generated by the ORMC sales and marketing analysts and are traditionally
used for planning purposes and therefore represent the best available projections
available. The standard deviation, cd, is the sampled year-over-year variability in
production from model year 2004 through 2007, in addition to the variability in UVP
from model year 2007 through the year under analysis for each product family. The
distribution is truncated at ±2 d to avoid the influence of extreme samples.
41
Capacity is modeled as a truncated normal, N(p,, a 2 ) where pc is equal to the current
operating capacity for each assembly line. The total capacity of the line is scaled to 85%
to account for standard efficiency factors applied by ORMC's manufacturing engineers.
Each line is modeled as a standard eight hour shift with two shifts per day, five days per
week. This standardization represents the ideal operating state, not the current operating
state where some lines are staffed for single shift operations while others consistently run
over two shifts per week with overtime. The variability, c, of each line has a standard
5% variation applied to it based on historic fluctuation. This distribution is bound by a
single shift operation at the low end and two shifts plus 25% overtime at the high end.
Random samples below or above these values are scaled to the minimum or maximum
accordingly.
The financial parameters enable the calculation of the output parameters as well as define
the arc weights used in the optimization algorithm. Each financial parameter is defined
on a per unit basis and is constant across each simulation and each network scenario.
Revenue from sales is equal to the weighted average of models within a family.
Recognized revenue is the revenue generated from sales to ORMC's dealer network at
the time of shipment. Their dealer network consists of independent dealerships. ORMC
does not sell products directly to consumers.
Cost management is an integral component of ORMC's manufacturing structure. For
each product family an operating cost is accounted for and updated quarterly. Operating
cost consists of two main categories as follows:
42
* Material cost is the cost of all the purchased parts but does not include parts
fabricated by ORMC. In addition, this includes plant scrap, supplier support, raw
material surcharges, prototype costs, funds generated from selling scrap, etc.
" Conversion is each plant's budget and all that this entails. This includes
fabrication of parts, transportation costs, in addition to four larger categories of
expense roughly split by the shown percentage:
o Spending such as part fabrication, labor, travel, training, office supplies,
phones, etc. (60%)
o Fringe (24%)
o Depreciation (15%)
o Taxes (1%)
Focused manufacturing ensures that the account for each product family is maintained
separately, therefore, the structure of this information is well formed for this analysis.
This cost is used as the production cost for assembling a product family on its primary
assembly line. Secondary assembly is defined as the line that has not historically been
capable of producing a given product but that has been assigned a new product family in
a given flexible network configuration. The cost of secondary unit production was
estimated for modeling purposes as a 5% increase if the assembly line is located at the
same plant and a 10% increase over primary production if it is located at another site.
This was determined by thorough analysis of the necessary assembly line modification,
supply chain modifications and labor modifications required to produce a single model on
a secondary line. This analysis was performed by manufacturing engineers at ORMC's
Site 1 assembly plant that produces Family 3-5 and verified by a manufacturing engineer
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at Site 2. 10% is a conservative estimate that incorporates a safety factor for unknown
elements that may have been overlooked during this cost analysis.
The last cost component is the opportunity loss or cost of lost sale. For the purposes of
this study shortages equate to lost sales. This is a simplification of the complexities
associated with demand management. However, it is used to provide a basis for
comparison between the modeled scenarios. Three possible results can occur from
unfulfilled demand. 1) A demand goes unfulfilled (a true lost sale), 2) a demand fulfilled
with the wrong product (resulting in the customer being less than 100% satisfied due to
content), or 3) a demand fulfilled with the right product but at a time and cost penalty due
to inventory transfer (a customer less than 100% satisfied due to time delay and cost of
carrying excessive inventory). The amount by which demand exceeds supply and the
exact amount of marginal customer satisfaction is not known exactly but has historically
been high. Recall that customer waiting lists were excessively long in the 1990's.
Waiting lists and customer product elasticity are no longer being observed in the market
place. Demand for particular models and features are being observed and the dealer
network confirms that customers are less flexible than they have been in the past. This is
an interesting dynamic. ORMC is facing competition from external entrants in the
market as well as from its own products in some sense. This may be a driving force
behind ORMC's shifting priority to provide the customer what they want, when they
want it. Therefore, valuing production shortages represents a gross approximation of
these market dynamics in financial terms that can be compared across each modeling
scenario. Specifically, the cost of a lost sale is valued at the selling price (recognized
revenue) plus 15% to represent the revenue generation from complementary ORMC
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parts, accessories and merchandise. This is based on historical estimates of the lifetime
investment per product above and beyond the purchase price.
From these inputs and parameters the linear program can be solved to determine the
minimal cost configuration that maximizes the operating profit. The total cost weighted
arc values result in the fulfillment of the highest margin product families over lower
margin families, which is the desired planning objective. The result is a specific amount
of products produced in each family from each assembly line. From this the following
output are computed:
" Sales (units): Number product sold or manufactured
" Shortfall (units): Number of missed sales or production target
" Utilization: Total capacity utilization of entire network
* Total Cost ($): Sum of operating cost per unit plus the amount of lost revenue due
to shortfalls
" Net Revenue ($): Amount of revenue generated from Sales net Total Cost
* Shortfall With Total Flex (units): A reference point generated by the same input
but assuming a total flexibly network in which each line can produce all of the
product families.
For the determination of how much flexibility is required each simulation was iterated
10,000 times for each scenario. Scenarios were generated based on the creation of
beneficial combinations as well as influenced by the structural, cultural and political
aspects of the ORMC manufacturing environment. These factors will be discussed in
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detail in the barriers to change section. To summarize, Table 2 shows the beneficial
scenarios created and defines the node network diagrams used to illustrate each scenario.
Table 2. Summarized flexible network designs used in this analysis
Node Diagram Description
O-LJ Key:
Circle represents a product family
Square represents an assembly line
Connecting arc indicates a product family can be produced on the
assembly line
Status Quo
OC - _ Current focused manufacturing operations
Capacity limited in future time period under analysis
~ Full Chain
Capability on each assembly line for 2 families (product mix
constant), models distributed so that a closed loop is created
Achieves 96% of Total Flexibility benefits, consistent with the
optimal solution derived by Jordan and Graves (1995)
Hybrid
Avoid inter-plant platform mixing with Dedicated Flexibility at Site 1
and full chain at Site 2
Dedicated Flexibility
Additional assembly line with ability to assemble all product families
Total Flexibility
Ability to produce all models on all lines
Used for benchmarking purposes, not a recommended scenario
These scenarios provide a range of possible options sufficient to compare against each
other. Prior to reviewing the result of these simulations a review of the validation of the
model will be given.
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Model Validation
To validate this model the input distributions and model parameters were updated to 2006
actual shipments, capacities and costs. Figure 19 show the distribution of unit sales,
production cost and operating profit of the simulation output relative to ORMC's actual
2006 performance. By comparing the actual outputs to the expected value from the
simulation, we obtain a percent error of 2.87%, 3.61% and 6.49% respectively.
(a)
(b)
rn-
(c)
Figure 19. Results of simulation validation. Dashed line represents the output distribution mean,
solid line represents ORMC 2006 actual for (a) unit sales (b) production cost (c) operating profit.
This shows that the simulation results are accurate while remaining conservative
estimates.
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Modeling Results
The results of the simulation show that a limited amount of flexibility can achieve the
desired result of being more responsive to market demands through volume and product
mix flexibility. Customer fulfillment can be increased while the utilization of
manufacturing assets is stabilized and increased. Figure 20 shows the results of
simulating each scenario.
200%
180% 1 Dedicated Flex
160% 9.2x) Full Chain Tota Flexibility(6.0x) 21.2x)
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Figure 20. Revenue versus utilization for each scenario. Diameter of the circle is proportional to
implementation cost.
Utilization is shown as a percentage of the aggregate utilization of all assembly lines. For
the time period being analyzed, maintaining the status quo (doing nothing) will result in a
utilization of 82% even though shortages are excessive, as shown in Figure 21. This is
due to the inflexibility of the current network. Response to fluctuations in demand is not
possible.
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Figure 21. Lost revenue due to unfulfilled demand for each scenario
Revenue, in Figure 20, is expressed as a percentage increase relative to the status quo.
For example, total flexibility would enable revenues of 1.76 times the status quo based on
the increase in sales and the ability to prioritize the highest demand and highest margin
products to the market. Figure 22 shows the unfulfilled products by family and by
scenario. Family 2 is the family with the highest projected demand as well as the highest
average selling price and unit profit margin. Therefore, the cost of doing nothing
amplifies the impact of being inflexible.
50,000
Family 2
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LL L L F
Status Quo Hybrid Dedicated Flex Full Chain Total Flexibility
Figure 22. Unit shortages of each product family in each simulation scenario
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Unfulfilled demand of the top tiered product has the dual impact of loss of a high margin
product and reduced customer service to the top sector of the customer base. Figure 22
shows that trade-offs for these high value product shortages with lower margin/lower
demand products (family 4) occur in the chained and total flexibility scenarios and thus
minimize the impact of shortfall.
These results show a level of robustness that allows for a clear recommendation to be
made as to which option is best to pursue. As shown previously in Figure 20, there is a
clear distinction between flexible scenarios and inflexible options. All options result in
greater than 1.5 times increase in revenue over doing nothing, representing billions of
dollars of revenue. There is also a clear differentiation between the hybrid/dedicated
flexibility scenarios and full chain flexibility scenario. The hybrid and dedicated
scenarios both require significant investment in an additional assembly line. Whereas the
full chain scenario is the utilization of existing capacity. The cost of implementing these
scenarios is based on the same analysis that was used to derive the increase in operating
cost. This invested capital is not included in the optimization algorithm. This is
represented in the graph as the parenthetical multiplicative factor for each scenario. For
example, full chain flexibility will cost 6 times as much as the status quo in implement,
whereas total flexibility would cost 21 times as much. The cost associated with the status
quo is simply the cost of balancing labor to the standardized shift schedule previously
described. The diameter of each datum is proportional to this cost relative to the status
quo point. Finally, full chain relative to total flexibility shows that chaining is the best
approach to implementing limited flexibility for ORMC. Nearly all of the benefits of
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total flexibility are achieved at significantly lower cost and complexity. For these reasons
it is recommended that full chain flexibility be pursued by ORMC.
Full Chain Flexibility Details
Full chain flexibility as presented by Graves and Jordan (1991) shows that limited
flexibility can achieve major benefits in the ability to respond to market uncertainties.
There are additional motivations for pursuing full chain flexibility for ORMC. Likewise,
there are caveats that must be stated to avoid potential long term impacts.
Profit Margin
Profit margin per unit is a critical management indicator. When the aggregate margin per
family is computed and compared across the simulation scenarios it can be seen that the
fully chained flexibility model provides the best opportunity to maintain margins in the
face of potentially increased production cost. Figure 23 shows the per unit percent
change in cost and margin of simulation results relative to the projected cost model. In
addition to the 5%/10% production cost increase these same simulations were run with a
2%/5% cost increase. Recall that the cost of secondary unit production was estimated a
5% increase if the assembly line is located at the same plant and a 10% increase over
primary production if it is located at another site. There are two reasons for evaluating a
reduced production cost, first the ORMC cost managers felt that the 5%/10% burden rate
was excessive and second the 2%/5% comparison allowed for the simulation of a
potential learning curve effect in secondary production. Figure 23 shows that for both
conditions full chain has the least impact on average per unit margin even with the higher
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cost associated with increased cross-site secondary assembly. Further there is the
possibility of actually improving margins as the learning curve is traversed.
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Figure 23. Impact of production cost on per unit profit margins. Volume is relative to demand.
Phased Implementation
Implementation of the full chain network can be accomplished in a phased approach.
This is a desirable condition from a cost and impact perspective. Implementation
occurring by building links one at a time allows learning to be gained though the process.
This also allows the cost of the implementation to be spread out over time. However,
caution must be taken to avoid the temptation to judge the success of this flexibility prior
to the completion of the last link in the chain. Figure 24 shows that the full benefit of this
network is not realized until the closed loop link enables the network to trade-off
production capacity across each assembly line. Intuitively, a phased implementation is a
risk adverse approach to implementing this type of flexibility. However, if judgment is
not reserved until the final link is enabled then the benefits of this investment may never
be gained due to losing organizational support for this effort.
52
Total Flexibility U
Full Chain U
4 Link Chain
3 Link Chain
* 2 Link Chain
No Flex 1 Link Chain
80% 84% 88% 92% 96% 100%
Utilization
Figure 24. Delayed benefits of implementing phased flexibility.
Sensitivity
The full chain model, relative to the hybrid scenario, is less sensitive to radical
fluctuations in demand. The full chain model is beneficial for all demand scenarios up to
the full capacity of the network. In fact, beyond the capacity of the network a full
chained model allows for the continued optimal allocation decisions to occur enabling the
trade-off of high value with low value models. In contrast, the hybrid scenario is more
sensitive to product family demand fluctuations. For example if the combined demand
for Family 1 and Family 2 drops then utilization of Site 1 will decrease. The full benefit
of the full chain design relies on the ability to utilize all assembly capacity with limited
flexibility.
Robustness
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The full chain model, in relation to the dedicated flexibility scenario, is more robust in
daily operations. The full chain model consists of a stable combination of product
families on a given line. For example, Assembly Line 2 will always have Family 1 and
Family 2 as its production portfolio. This will enable proficiency to be obtained by the
technicians on this line. Assembly Line 2 will see shifts in the relative quantities of one
family over another but over time this will become no more visible to the line operator
than model sequencing is today. In contrast, the dedicated flexibility model is a network
dominated by primary line production. The hyper-flexibility required of the new line will
require developing and maintaining the capability of producing all product families. It is
unknown how feasible this is but if it is taken as possible then there will remain a high
degree of variability in this line's daily operations. The quantity of Family 1 and 2
production will be high with the given demand profile. This will make Family 3-5
production a lower priority on the flexible line. Quality concerns on low running
products will increase significantly.
Knowledge Transfer
Full chain flexibility will also allow for knowledge sharing between the platform
organizations. Using Line 2 as an example again, Family 1 and Family 2 will be the new
mix of sequenced products. This daily operation will give rise to continuous
improvement opportunities that will be the means by which platform knowledge is shared
back and forth. Furthermore, knowledge transfer will also become fully chained allowing
for the proliferation of ideas throughout all platforms. In contrast, knowledge transfer
will be isolated by site in the hybrid model or limited by the ability for the dedicated
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flexibility organization's ability to absorb knowledge and subsequently distribute it back
through the platform organizations.
Simulation Model Summary
The modeling of demand and capacity as normal distributions allows for the random
sampling of feasible combinations for use in evaluating a number of flexibility scenarios.
This evaluation is based on the optimization of a linear program based on a node network
model with weighted connecting arcs representing the unit production costs of producing
a given product family on a given assembly line. Minimization of the cost of maximally
fulfilling market demand for all families results in a set of value measures that are
compared to scenario extremes of no flexibility and total flexibility.
The optimal results derived by Graves and Jordan (1991) are supported by results
obtained here. The full chain flexibility model is recommended as the best method for
ORMC to deal with their current capacity constrained forecast, as well as, a network
design that will enable them to adequately respond to changes in product demand beyond
the ±2-constraints applied in this model.
The benefits of this recommendation extend beyond the ability to satisfy demand and
effective capacity utilization. Variability in labor management will be reduced due to the
ability to operate each assembly line with a standard two shift schedule. Knowledge
transfer across platform organizations will be possible. Furthermore, this knowledge
transfer will be reinforced through the network design and will ultimately allow best
known methods to propagate to all platforms without modification to the platforms which
could jeopardize platform uniqueness.
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Finally, it is recommended that an accelerated implementation phasing approach be
utilized. Phased implementation will enable project learning to occur and be utilized in
subsequent modification efforts. However, the duration of the roll-out of this initiative
should be minimized due to the fact that the full flexibility benefits are not obtained until
the final link of the chain is put in place. If a phased approach is to be utilized then a
clear and deliberate expectation should be set regarding the performance of the network.
Barriers to Change
Implementation of these recommendations was not possible in the timeframe of this
internship. However, considerable stakeholder management was conducted as a means
of preparing ORMC for a potential change of this magnitude. In addition, preparation for
this analysis included significant informal interviewing conducted as a method for
determining the critical aspects of flexibility from the wider ORMC employee base. This
outsider on the inside perspective (Klein 2004), enables this information to be
summarized in an organizational process analysis. Figure 25 is a stakeholder map of the
ORMC employees that were pertinent to this study during the internship.
- Direct relation/influence
--- Indirect relation/influence coo
- Direct report VP - Supply Chain
Site I CIO
Site 2 VP - Powertrain
CFO %%Operations
Mgr Mfg Support
VP Strategic VP - Sales &
Planning Marketing
Dir Mfg
Cost Analyst improvement
VP & GM -Site 2
Finance Mgr 25-tko e m Sales Planning &
Analysis Mgr
Dir - Strategic%
Planningner
Project Mgr - Preject Mgr -
Materials Assembly Systems
Figure 25. Stakeholder map of key ORMC personnel
56
These stakeholders are representatives from throughout the leadership structure at ORMC
and shown in Figure 26.
Figure 26. Stakeholder alignment to the leadership structure of ORMC
The three-lens framework for this analysis is based heavily on (Ancona, et al 2004)
where lenses of strategic (the term structure will be used), cultural and political are used
to describe the organizational processes at work within an organization. Three specific
areas of consideration will be highlighted and the relevant structural, cultural and
political components will be reviewed in relation to how these represent a barrier to
implementing this change.
Sites
Structure
ORMC maintains two major sites that contain the five assembly lines. Site 1 was
established as the primary assembly facility for the company in 1973. This is the larger
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of the two sites and employs roughly half of the company's workforce. This site also
manufactures the two top selling product families. In 2001 a new building was
constructed at Site 1 and dedicated to Family 1 production. Site 2 was built in 1998 in
response to the company growth during this time period. Site 2 manufactures families 3-
5 and also fabricates and assembles the 3 rd generation engine used in Family 5 models.
Engines for all other families, at both sites, are supplied from two power train
manufacturing facilities located in another state.
Each factory operates independently with minimal salaried employee sharing and no
union resource sharing. The factory managers interact via the produce product circle and
have shared management incentives but rely on each other to independently contribute to
shared incentive targets.
Political
The long history at Site 1 makes it the standard by which Site 2 and other sites are
judged. Until 1998 all ORMC products were produced at Site 1 and for most of that time
it occurred on a single assembly line. When Site 2 started operations it enabled focused
manufacturing to take root due to the possibility of having dedicated assembly lines for
each product family. However, this created some tension between the sites because Site
1 was losing work to Site 2.
Cultural
Prior to the production of ORMC products, Site 1 was a heavy machinery manufacturing
facility. Safes and locks, 40mm naval ship guns and rocket boosters were among the
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items produced on this site. This has bread a culture of time and perspective that they say
is "in the bricks". Site 1 continues to hand weld structural components that have long
since been automated at Site 2. Site 1 also maintains a core competency in a material
finishing process that is a critical differentiator for ORMC's products.
Site 2 was a green field startup, designed for the manufacture of ORMC products.
ORMC used this plant as an opportunity to implement numerous process innovations that
were difficult and costly to implement on the existing line at Site 1. The latest in
assembly technology, material handling and ergonomic equipment were installed. In
addition, ORMC established a progressive relationship with its unions at Site 2. Union
workers were organized into self-sustaining teams without work group supervisors and
partnership between union leaders and factory management were unheralded. The site
manager and the union leaders share an office to symbolize the commitment to an open
partnership.
These site differences led to underlying tension between them. As an example, when Site
1 began construction and startup of their new facility, t-shirts reading "We don't give a
**** how [Site 2] does it!" became popular among the employees at Site 1.
An attempt was made to mitigate this tension between the sites by including both sites on
the flexibility project team. The team never reached strict consensus regarding the best
choice of flexibility as evident by the development of the hybrid and dedicated flexibility
scenarios. The hybrid model eliminates the cross-site transfer of material and thus
eliminates a source of conflict. In addition it minimized the flexibility requirements at
Site 1. Site 1 is conservative its assessment of the viability of multi-family assembly
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lines due to their past experience with a single assembly line production of all ORMC
products. The limited flexibility associated with the full chain model was not sufficient
to convince Site 1 that this benefit outweighs the potential tradeoffs in complexity and
quality, as such a demonstration of this capability is likely to be required to fully gain
their support.
Union
ORMC has a reputation for having good relations with its union not only at Sites 1 and 2
but at the subcomponent manufacturing facilities as well. However, Site 1 has a more
traditional relationship with its union relative to Site 2.
Structure
The unions are an integral part of ORMC structure. They agreed to a formal partnership
contract that they have maintained since the mid-1990s. In this agreement, union
stewards and HMDC management have a formal consensus decision making process.
Political
This relationship has been strained recently. A sub-component facility had a site
expansion proposal initially voted down as a rejection of concessions ORMC was
seeking, that was later overturned. Site 1 recently ended a multi-week strike that resulted
from restructuring their union contract. This political struggle manifests itself in the topic
of flexibility by creating boundaries on the possible flexibility components. Labor
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flexibility is not likely a viable short-term option, the union contracts prohibit employees
from flexing from one line to another in other than temporary circumstances.
Cultural
Site 1 has a history of high utilization and plentiful opportunities for overtime. Site 2 has
yet to fully utilize its installed capacity. Leveling production across both sites will
change this dynamic for both sites. Initial resistance to this change may come from both
sites but this should be a win-win-win situation for both sites' unions as well as ORMC
management. Excessive utilization in Site 1 can strain the resources, under utilization of
resources at Site 2 results in high variability of resource needs. Shift based operations
result in discontinuous discrete staffing needs. For example, Family 3 demand is
currently at a level that requires either 1 shift plus overtime to marginally fulfill this
demand or an under loaded second shift.
Leadership model
The leadership model shown in Figure 26 relies on consensus decision making. This
decision making style itself represents a barrier to change in the scope of influence
required to gain the necessary support for change. However, there are more subtle
challenges that can be revealed with a three lens analysis.
Structure
As previously mentioned the three leadership circles have been reorganized into four
leadership areas. These leadership circles: Produce Products, Design Products, Sales and
Marketing and Provide Support were redesigned to enable ORMC to be "more customer-
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driven" 2 The stated structural change is the creation of the Design Products and Sales
and Marketing circles from the former Create Demand leadership circle. This allows
engineering, to be combined with styling, quality and reliability as part of a consensus
group. However, this results in the formalization of the distinction between designing the
product and manufacturing the product. This is not an issue in isolation but the following
responsibilities have been assigned to the design product circle: bring the right products
to market faster, improve product quality and lower the cost to deliver the product. This
is a point of potential conflict. In relation to flexibility initiatives there is a misalignment
between the produce and design product circles. This analysis has been sponsored by the
produce product group without input from the design product group.
Political
Within the leadership circles there are two encamped groups of stakeholders: those that
view the manufacturing strategy as sufficient and oppose change and those that believe a
change is needed in the manufacturing strategy and support flexibility. This thesis has
been written for both audiences in hopes that consensus can be achieved and
modifications made.
Cultural
The consensus leadership model makes strategic issues difficult if they are not being
delivered in a top-down fashion. In this case generic "flexibility" has been handed down
to all groups. The specific flexibility recommendation needs a champion and owner.
This is a strategic initiative, should it therefore be owned from within the strategic
2 From internal ORMC communication regarding the organizational restructuring
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planning organization, which is part of the Provide Support Circle? It is a large scale
change within the manufacturing network, should it therefore be driven from the Produce
Products Circle? Finally, flexibility is an enabler to delivering the right product to the
market faster at a lower cost. Does this then imply that it should be owned with the
Design Products Circle, consistent with their responsibilities? These questions are not
answered here but are raised in recognition that if there is ambiguity in this decision, then
reaching consensus will be difficult.
Conclusion
ORMC, a producer of luxury recreational products is being challenged to be more
responsive to its customers and fluctuation in the market. ORMC's historic evolution in
its industry shows it to be in a maturing market with the rate of product and process
innovation slowing. ORMC is now pursuing means of provide products to its mature
market while trying to stimulate demand in emerging demographic and geographic
markets as well as achieve disruptive innovation with new product families. Urgency to
implement change is growing due to the ineffective utilization of capacity. This
inefficiency is resulting in the inability to fulfill demand of high value products, creating
variability in labor management and becoming increasingly costly to expand.
Flexibility is a means for addressing these particular issues. Flexibility is an often cited
as ideal for addressing a great number of issues. For ORMC, flexibility in volume and
product mix throughout its manufacturing network is in order. This can be accomplished
through the implementation of a limited flexibility strategy known as full chain
flexibility. Full chain flexibility will enable the fulfillment of the optimal mix of
63
products in an uncertain market within minimal modification to the existing
manufacturing network. This also represents a minimal increase in complexity on each
line while achieving nearly the same benefits of a totally flexible network. Simulations
reveal that greater than a 1.5 times increase in net revenue is possible over the current
dedicated assembly line strategy. An increase in operating profit is possible with
modification to the existing network of assembly lines and can result in increases in
capacity utilization to nearly 95%. For less than the cost of implementing another
dedicated assembly line, which would only alleviate capacity constraint for a single
product family, ORMC can transform their assembly network to be flexible enough to
deal with their future projected demand. This network configuration is also robust
enough to handle dramatically different demand profiles from within its product
portfolio.
Many challenges must be faced to realize this level of flexibility. It is recommended that
ORMC identify a project champion and clear owner who can oversee the implementation
of a single link in the full chain model. Following the successful completion of this
phase of the project the learning should be collected in preparation for a final second
phase. A concurrent implementation of the remaining links will enable the realization of
the benefits of full chain flexibility in a timely fashion. In order to gain consensus for
this change a coalition of members from both assembly sites, from the four leadership
circles, and from the union representatives should be formed. Engagement of the union is
also recommended in the design of how each line should be modified in order to achieve
this flexibility. Doing so will reduce apprehension and build acceptance of the initiative,
while identifying opportunities for improvement in implementation.
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